Centro Atlántico de Estudios Ríos Pérez

This paper computes the optimal progressivity of the income tax code in a dynamic general equilibrium model with household heterogeneity in which uninsurable labor productivity risk gives rise to a nontrivial income and wealth distribution. A progressive tax system serves as a partial substitute for missing insurance markets and enhances an equal distribution of economic welfare. These beneficial effects of a progressive tax system have to be traded o¤ against the e¢ciency loss arising from distorting endogenous labor supply and capital accumulation decisions. A determination of the optimal progressivity of the income tax code therefore calls for a quantitative exploration.
Using a utilitarian steady state social welfare criterion we find that the optimal US income tax is well approximated by a flat tax rate of 19.5% and a fixed deduction of about $3,700: The steady state welfare gains from a fundamental tax reform towards this tax system are equivalent to 0.4% higher consumption in each state of the world. An explicit computation of the transition path induced by a reform of the current towards the optimal tax system indicates, however, that a majority of the population currently alive would suffer welfare losses, calling into question the political feasibility of such fundamental income tax reform.

This paper uses a seminonparametric model and Consumer Expenditure Survey data to estimate life cycle profiles of consumption, controlling for demographics, cohort and time effects. In addition to documenting profiles for total and nondurable consumption, we devote special attention to the age expenditure pattern for consumer durables. We find hump-shaped paths over the life cycle for total, for nondurable and for durable expenditures. Changes in household size account for roughly half of these humps. The other half remains unaccounted for by the standard complete markets life cycle model. Our results imply that households do not smooth consumption over their lifetimes. This is especially true for services from consumer durables. Bootstrap simulations suggest that our empirical estimates are tight and sensitivity analysis indicates that the computed profiles are robust to a large number of di.erent specifications.

This paper presents a model in which technological change increases the share of reproducible factors at the expense of nonreproducible ones. When reproducible factors are abundant, firms have incentives to adopt technologies that are intensive in such resources, and this increases the incentives to invest more in them. This feedback process may generate growth or also stagnation: when reproducible factors are not abundant, firms do not have incentives to adopt technologies intensive in those resources and technological change does not take place. The paper also analyzes how biased technological change a.ects interpersonal distribution of income: nonreproducible factors are more equally distributed than reproducible ones, thus biased technological change increases inequality.

There are some empirical facts that growth models usually cannot explain: i) the di.erences in consumption growth rates across countries when international capital markets are considered, ii) the low growth and low levels of education in developing countries where the return on education is very high. This paper introduces a generational structure that implies that the return on human capital is higher than the return on physical capital and that consumption growth rates vary across countries when international capital markets are included. The human capital technology of the paper implies that poor countries grow more slowly and invest a smaller share of income on education, in spite of an extraordinarily high return on education and the existence of international capital markets.

This paper presents a neoclassical growth model with financial intermediation in which government expenditure is used to enforce the law. Government expenditure increases the probability that the financial contract are enforced and reduces financial intermediation costs. There is a feed back process: low per capita capital involves low government expenditure and low probability of enforcing financial contracts, which reduces the incentives to accumulate capital. As a consequence of this feed back process there are three steady states: one without financial intermediation and low per capita capital, another with low probability of enforcing the financial contract and medium per capita capital and other with high probability of enforcing the contract and high per capita capital. The dynamic around the steady state with low enforcing probability is characterized by multiple equilibria and cyclical behavior, the dynamics around the two others steady states presents the typical saddle point dynamics.

Slow technological progress and financial sectors with low productivity are endemic among developing countries. This paper presents a model in which technological progress a.ects the productivity of the financial sector. When the technological progress is fast, the financial intermediation costs are low and this increases the incentives to invest in new technology. This feed back process involves the existence of two types of balanced growth path equilibria: one in which the productivity of the financial sector is high and the technological progress fast, and other in which the productivity of the financial sector is low and the technological progress slow. It also may appear an steady state in which there is neither financial sector nor technological progress. Multiple equilibria and indeterminacy of equilibria may arise: for given initial conditions, there are several equilibrium paths converging to di.erent balanced growth paths with di.erent growth rates.