

The Long-Term Distributional and Welfare Effects of Covid-19 School Closures

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Motivation

- ▶ Governments worldwide reacted to Covid-19 pandemic closing schools
 - ▶ And child care centers
- ▶ Economic consequences of school closures on affected children are not easily measured
 - ▶ Arise in the longer term
- ▶ Parents may lessen negative effect of school closures on their children
 - ▶ Adjusting time investment into children's education
 - ▶ Adjusting monetary investment into children's education
 - ▶ Adjusting monetary transfers for their children
- ▶ Parental background may matter for these adjustments
 - ▶ Assets, income
 - ▶ Age of children during the shock

This Paper

- ▶ Consequences of the school and child care closures on affected children
 - ▶ Human capital as they progress through their school ages
 - ▶ Their high-school graduation and college choice
 - ▶ Their labor market earnings
 - ▶ Welfare
- ▶ Build life-cycle model with children's human capital production function
 1. Time and monetary inputs by parents
 2. Governmental investment into schooling as input
- ▶ Two main experiments
 1. Model school and child care closures as a reduction in the governmental investment in children
 2. Model a negative income shock to parents due to the Covid-induced economic recession

Outline

1. Model
2. Calibration
3. Results
4. Conclusions

Model overview

- ▶ Life cycle of one adult and one children generation
 - ▶ in partial equilibrium
- ▶ Parental educational investment in children's human capital
 - ▶ Monetary and time investment
 - ▶ May lessen effects of school closures
- ▶ State variables in this economy

Table 1: State Variables

State Var.	Values	Interpretation
k	$k \in \{ch, pa\}$	Generation
m	$m \in \{si, ma\}$	Marital Status
j	$j \in \{0, 1, \dots, J\}$	Model Age
a	$a \geq -\underline{a}(j, s, k)$	Assets
h	$h > 0$	Human Capital
s	$s \in \{no, hi, co\}$	Education
η	$\eta \in \{\eta_l, \eta_h\}$	Persistent Productivity Shock
ε	$\varepsilon \in \{\varepsilon_1, \dots, \varepsilon_n\}$	Transitory Productivity Shock

Timeline: Parental households

Life Cycle of Parental Households

Initial Distribution

$\Phi(m,s,a)$


Children Leave Household

Pay inter-vivos transfers b

Earnings while Working

wage w $e \eta \epsilon$ until retirement
working time $l(m)$ depends on marital status

e = age and educ. specific wage profile
 η = persistent productivity shock, 2-state Markov
 ϵ = transitory productivity shock



Timeline: Parental households

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
Children Leave Household

Pay inter-vivos transfers b

Earnings while Working

wage $w \in \eta \in \epsilon$ until retirement
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e = age and educ. specific wage profile
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- ▶ $h' = g(j, h, i^m, i^t, i^g)$: Children's human capital production function
- ▶ i^m, i^t : Monetary and time investment into children's human capital
- ▶ i^g : Government investment into children's education
- ▶ $y(j, s, m) = w \cdot \epsilon(j, s, m) \cdot \eta \cdot \varepsilon \cdot l(m)$: Labor income of parents
- ▶ $\epsilon(j, s, m)$: Age, education, marital specific wage profile

Timeline: Child households

Life Cycle of Child Households

Birth

Draw:

$h_0 \sim$
 $n(m_p, s_p)$

Higher Education?


Given h_{j_a}
i) parents pay inter-vivo transfers
ii) children make higher education decision, with psychological costs $p(h_{j_a}, s_p)$

Choice: $s=(no, hs, co)?$

Earnings while Working

wage w $\gamma \in \eta$ until retirement
working time $l(s)$ after completed education
reduced working time during education

$\gamma(h_{j_a}) =$ fixed effect
 $e =$ age and educ. specific wage profile
 $\eta =$ persistent productivity shock, 2-state Markov
 $\epsilon =$ transitory productivity shock



- ▶ $y(j, s, m = si, h) = w \cdot \gamma(s, h) \cdot \epsilon(j, s, m) \cdot \eta \cdot \epsilon \cdot l(si)$: Labor income of children
- ▶ $\gamma(s, h)$: Idiosyncratic permanent productivity state

Calibration

- ▶ Two stages

1. Parameters calibrated exogenously not using the model
2. Parameters calibrated endogenously by matching moments in the data

Calibration

- ▶ Two stages
 1. Parameters calibrated exogenously not using the model
 2. Parameters calibrated endogenously by matching moments in the data
- ▶ I focus on human capital production function parameters
 - ▶ At birth age $j = 0$, children draw innate ability $h_0 \sim \Psi(h(j = 0)|s_p, m_p)$
 - ▶ Letter Word test score distribution in the PSID
 - ▶ At ages j_0, \dots, j_{a-1} children receive education investments
 - ▶ $h' = g(j, h, i^m, i^t, i^g)$

Human Capital Production Function

$$h'(j) = \left(k_j^h h^{1-\frac{1}{\sigma^h}} + (1 - k_j^h) i(j)^{1-\frac{1}{\sigma^h}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\sigma^h}}} \quad (1)$$

$$i(j) = \bar{A} \left(k_j^g \left(\frac{i^g}{\bar{i}^g} \right)^{1-\frac{1}{\sigma^g}} + (1 - k_j^g) \left(\frac{i^p(j)}{\bar{i}^g} \right)^{1-\frac{1}{\sigma^g}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\sigma^g}}} \quad (2)$$

$$i^p(j) = \left(k_j^m \left(\frac{i^m}{\bar{i}^m, d} \right)^{1-\frac{1}{\sigma^m}} + (1 - k_j^m) \left(\frac{i^t(j)}{\bar{i}^m, d} \right)^{1-\frac{1}{\sigma^m}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\sigma^m}}} \quad (3)$$

► \bar{x} : unconditional mean

Calibration: Human Capital Production Function

$$h'(j) = \left(k_j^h h^{1-\frac{1}{\sigma^h}} + (1 - k_j^h) i(j)^{1-\frac{1}{\sigma^h}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\sigma^h}}} \quad (4)$$

1. $\sigma^h = 1$: mean value for young and old children in Cunha et al. (2010)
2. k_j^h : to match time investment by age of the child, modeled as

$$\ln \left(\frac{1 - k_j^h}{k_j^h} \right) = \alpha_0^{k^h} + \alpha_1^{k^h} \cdot j + \alpha_2^{k^h} \cdot j^2$$

- ▶ $\alpha_1^{k^h}, \alpha_2^{k^h}$: by indirect inference
 - ▶ Log per child time investments in the data equals the pattern in the model
 - ▶ Ages 6 to 14
- ▶ $\alpha_0^{k^h}$: To match monetary investments

Calibration: Human Capital Production Function

$$i(j) = \bar{A} \left(k_j^g \left(\frac{i_j^g}{\bar{i}^g} \right)^{1 - \frac{1}{\sigma^g}} + (1 - k_j^g) \left(\frac{i^p(j)}{\bar{i}^g} \right)^{1 - \frac{1}{\sigma^g}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1 - \frac{1}{\sigma^g}}} \quad (5)$$

1. $\sigma^g = 2.43$: from Kotera and Seshadri (2017)
2. $k_j^g = \bar{k}_j^g$ for $j > 0$: Kotera and Seshadri (2017)
 - ▶ $k_0^g = 0.44$: To match average time investments into age 4 child
3. \bar{A} : Normalization so that average human capital equals 1

Calibration: Human Capital Production Function

$$i^P(j) = \left(k_j^m \left(\frac{i^m}{\bar{i}^{m,d}} \right)^{1 - \frac{1}{\sigma^m}} + (1 - k_j^m) \left(\frac{i^t(j)}{\bar{i}^{t,d}} \right)^{1 - \frac{1}{\sigma^m}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1 - \frac{1}{\sigma^m}}} \quad (6)$$

1. $\sigma^m = 1$: from Lee and Seshadri (2019)
2. k_j^m : to match monetary investment by age of the child, modeled as

$$\ln \left(\frac{1 - k_j^m}{k_j^m} \right) = \alpha_0^{k^m} + \alpha_1^{k^m} \cdot j$$

- ▶ $\alpha_1^{k^m}$: by indirect inference
 - ▶ To match monetary investment profile
- ▶ $\alpha_0^{k^m}$: To normalize $k_3^m = 0.5$

Calibration: Human Capital Production Function

$$i^P(j) = \left(k_j^m \left(\frac{i^m}{\bar{i}^{m,d}} \right)^{1 - \frac{1}{\sigma^m}} + (1 - k_j^m) \left(\frac{i^t(j)}{\bar{i}^{t,d}} \right)^{1 - \frac{1}{\sigma^m}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1 - \frac{1}{\sigma^m}}} \quad (6)$$


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
- ▶ $\alpha_1^{k^m}$: by indirect inference
 - ▶ To match monetary investment profile
- ▶ $\alpha_0^{k^m}$: To normalize $k_3^m = 0.5$
- ▶ **Why $i^P(j)$ does not depend on parental education?**

Calibration: Human Capital Production Function

Figure 2: Age Dependent Parameters κ_j^h, κ_j^m over Child Age



(a) Weight κ_j^h



(b) Weight κ_j^m

Experiment


1. Impact of school closures that last for half a year
 - ▶ Corresponds to a reduction of government time investments i^g by 25%
 - ▶ The model has two year periods
2. In addition parents receive negative income shocks
 - ▶ Mainly driven by a reduction of hours worked
 - ▶ Reductions are more severe for parents with lower educational attainment

Impact of school closures that last for half a year


1. On average (across children aged 4 to 14 when the shock occurs)
 - ▶ Increase in future share of children without a high school degree of 7%
 - ▶ Decrease in future share of children with a college degree of -3.2%
2. On average, earnings losses of -0.95%
 - ▶ Induced by reduced human capital and lower educational attainment
3. These effects materialize despite a significant endogenous adjustment of parental investments into their children
 - ▶ Time inputs rise by 7.3% and monetary inputs by 14.7%
4. Large welfare loss of children from school closures of -0.55%
 - ▶ Measured as consumption-equivalent variation
 - ▶ Adding income changes marginally welfare loss to -0.56%
5. Heterogenous welfare lost by parental characteristics
 - ▶ Smallest welfare losses (-0.4%) for children of college-educated parents
 - ▶ Larger losses (-0.7%) for children whose parents are high school dropouts

Investment in human capital over life-cycle for children of age 6

Figure 5: Money and Time Investments and Human Capital over Remaining Child Life-Cycle for Children of Age 6




(a) Money Investments



(b) Time Investments

Investment in human capital over life-cycle for children of age 6

Figure 5: Money and Time Investments and Human Capital over Remaining Child Life-Cycle for Children of Age 6



- ▶ Larger welfare losses for younger children
- ▶ Aged 6 at the time of the crisis amount to -0.71%

Conclusions

- ▶ Interesting paper to study the effects of school closures (not only Covid-related)
- ▶ Useful framework to think about the importance of opening schools in areas where children don't have access to it
 - ▶ These are usually poor areas
 - ▶ Parents do not have good inputs to mitigate the lack of schools
- ▶ Author should think about heterogeneity in parents time inputs for education
 - ▶ Less educated parents are likely less effective educating their children
 - ▶ Adding this feature would magnify effects on disadvantaged children
- ▶ Authors do not model the health benefits of the school closures
 - ▶ This would reduce the net costs of school closure
 - ▶ Health costs should be more important for parental generation
 - ▶ Probability of dying of Covid is higher for old people

Thanks

Annex

Education Decision

$$s = \begin{cases} no & \text{if } V(j_a, s = no; a, h) \geq \max\{V(j_a, s = hs, s_p; a, h), V(j_a, s = co, s_p; a, h)\} \\ hs & \text{if } V(j_a, s = hs, s_p; a, h) \geq \max\{V(j_a, s = no; a, h), V(j_a, s = co, s_p; a, h)\} \\ co & \text{if } V(j_a, s = co; s_p, a, h) \geq \max\{V(j_a, s = no; a, h), V(j_a, s = hs, s_p; a, h)\}, \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

Children Problem

$$V(j, no, \eta, \varepsilon; a, h) = \max_{c, a'} \left\{ u(c) - v(\ell(si)) + \beta \sum_{\eta'} \pi(\eta' | \eta) \sum_{\varepsilon'} \psi(\varepsilon') V(j+1, no, \eta', \varepsilon'; a', h) \right\}$$

subject to

$$a' + c(1 + \tau^c) = a(1 + r(1 - \tau^k)) + y(1 - \tau^p) - T(y(1 - 0.5\tau^p))$$

$$y = w\gamma(no, h)\epsilon(no, j, si)\eta\varepsilon\ell(si)$$

$$a' \geq 0$$

Parents Problem

$$V(j, s, m, \eta, \varepsilon; a, h) = \max_{c, i^m, i^t, a', h'} \left\{ u \left(\frac{c}{1 + \zeta_c \xi(m, s) + \mathbf{1}_{m=ma} \zeta_a} \right) - v \left(\frac{\ell(m) + \kappa \cdot \xi(m, s) \cdot i^t}{1 + \mathbf{1}_{m=ma}} \right) + \beta \sum_{\eta'} \pi(\eta' | \eta) \sum_{\varepsilon'} \psi(\varepsilon') V(j, s, m, \eta', \varepsilon'; a', h') \right\}$$

subject to

$$a' + c(1 + \tau^c) + \xi(m, s)i^m = a(1 + r(1 - \tau^k)) + y(1 - \tau^p) - T(y(1 - 0.5\tau^p))$$

$$y = w\epsilon(s, j, m)\eta\varepsilon\ell(m)$$

$$a' \geq -\underline{a}(j, s, k)$$

$$h' = g(j, h, i(i^m, i^t, i^g))$$

Parental decisions by age of children during shock

Table 12: Parental Decisions in Period of Covid-19 Impact

	baseline	% -Change for Children of Biological Age						
		average	4	6	8	10	12	14
Panel A: Lockdown of Schools								
av mon inv	\$1,385	14.67	10.03	15.74	15.21	15.21	15.61	16.24
av time inv	25.17	7.27	4.75	7.62	7.40	7.51	7.87	8.46

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