Macro Het Agents 081

Preliminary

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Based on joint work with S. Dyrda, G Kaplan, S. Tanaka and others

Multi Person Households

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    - Emancipation of Children/Dependents
    - Marriage (common law or not)
    - Fertility

First, most boring issue

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with, say

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- What if they do not agree? 3 standard models:
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  - Delegating on a Planner with updates
- An additional new Model with advantages (no record keeping and others) (Kato and Ríos Rull (2023))

- Agents behave independently

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- Result is inefficient: Consumption good is lower than in the previous case

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- Only Efficient marriages exist

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- But Crucially, weights can change.
- Why? Because it is needed to keep a recalcitrant partner within the marriage. A

A new way without record keeping

References

Kato, A., and J. V. Ríos Rull (2023): "A protocol for repeated bargaining," *Economics Letters*, 227, 111132.