

# Macro Het Agents 081

Preliminary

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Penn/UCL 2023

Based on joint work with S. Dyrda, G Kaplan, S. Tanaka and others

## Multi Person Households

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  - Emancipation of Children/Dependents
  - Marriage (common law or not)
  - Fertility

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with, say

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- What if they do not agree? 3 standard models:
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  - Delegating on a Planner with updates
- An additional new Model with advantages (no record keeping and others) (Kato and Ríos Rull (2023))



- Agents behave independently

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- Result is inefficient: Consumption good is lower than in the previous case

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- Only Efficient marriages exist

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- Why? Because it is needed to keep a recalcitrant partner within the marriage. A



## References

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Kato, A., and J. V. Ríos Rull (2023): "A protocol for repeated bargaining," *Economics Letters*, 227, 111132.